SRC= http://foo.example/pr/01012003.html>
The pr web application in the example above creates the HTML
with a static menu and a dynamically generated FRAME SRC. The
pr_content frame pulls its source from the URL parameter value
of pg to display the requested press release content. But what if an
attacker altered the normal URL to
http://foo.example/pr?pg=http://attacker.example/sp
oofed_press_release.html? Without properly sanity checking
the pg value, the resulting HTML would be:
Code Snippet:
http://attacker.example/spoofed_press_release.html >
To the end user, the attacker.example spoofed content appears
authentic and delivered from a legitimate source.
References
A new spoof: all frames based sites are vulnerable SecureXpert
Labs
23
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