explicit content on the Internet.

In an effort to avoid the potentially fatal legal implications of the overblocking

problem, the government falls back on the ability of the libraries, under CIPA's disabling

provisions, 

see

 CIPA   1712 (codified at 20 U.S.C.   9134(f)(3)), CIPA  1721(b)

(codified at 47 U.S.C.   254(h)(6)(D)), to unblock a site that is patently proper yet

improperly blocked.  The evidence reflects that libraries can and do unblock the filters

when a patron so requests.  But it also reflects that requiring library patrons to ask for a

Web site to be unblocked will deter many patrons because they are embarrassed, or desire

to protect their privacy or remain anonymous.  Moreover, the unblocking may take days,

and may be unavailable, especially in branch libraries, which are often less well staffed

than main libraries.  Accordingly, CIPA's disabling provisions do not cure the

constitutional deficiencies in public libraries' use of Internet filters. 

Under these circumstances we are constrained to conclude that the library

plaintiffs must prevail in their contention that CIPA requires them to violate the First

Amendment rights of their patrons, and accordingly is facially invalid, even under the

standard urged on us by the government, which would permit us to facially invalidate

CIPA only if it is impossible for a single public library to comply with CIPA's conditions

without violating the First Amendment.  In view of the limitations inherent in the filtering

technology mandated by CIPA, any public library that adheres to CIPA's conditions will

necessarily restrict patrons' access to a substantial amount of protected speech, in

violation of the First Amendment.  Given this conclusion, we need not reach plaintiffs'

15