the fact that the Internet reverses the acquisition process and requires the libraries to, in

effect, purchase the entire Internet, some of which (e.g., hardcore pornography) it does

not want, should not mean that it is chargeable with censorship when it filters out

offending material.

The legal context in which this extensive factual record is set is complex,

implicating a number of constitutional doctrines, including the constitutional limitations

on Congress's spending clause power, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, and

subsidiary to these issues, the First Amendment doctrines of prior restraint, vagueness,

and overbreadth. There are a number of potential entry points into the analysis, but the

most logical is the spending clause jurisprudence in which the seminal case is 

South

Dakota v. Dole

, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).  

Dole

 outlines four categories of constraints on

Congress's exercise of its power under the Spending Clause, but the only 

Dole

 condition

disputed here is the fourth and last, i.e., whether CIPA requires libraries that receive

LSTA funds or E rate discounts to violate the constitutional rights of their patrons.  As

will appear, the question is not a simple one, and turns on the level of scrutiny applicable

to a public library's content based restrictions on patrons' Internet access.  Whether such

restrictions are subject to strict scrutiny, as plaintiffs contend, or only rational basis

review, as the government contends, depends on public forum doctrine.

The government argues that, in providing Internet access, public libraries do not

create a public forum, since public libraries may reserve the right to exclude certain

speakers from availing themselves of the forum.  Accordingly, the government contends

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